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Introduction
The capability of developing countries to engage in international trade is conditioned by rich country policies. Trade barriers arise from direct interventions in the price determination process, either through the application of tari¤s, quotas or subsidies to exports or gsanchez@ieral.org, Viamonte 610, 2nd ‡oor, Buenos Aires, 1053, Argentina. y malzua@cedlas.org, Calle 6 entre 47 and 48, 1900, La Plata, Argentina. z ibutler@ieral.org, Viamonte 610, 2nd ‡oor, Buenos Aires, 1053, Argentina.
x The authors would like to thank the Global Development Network for its support to the present project. production, or through the application of standards and regulations. As tari¤ and quota barriers to trade in agricultural, food, and manufactured products continue to decline due to the proliferation of multilateral trade agreements, increasing public debate is taking place regarding the impact of product and process standards and technical regulations. Standards and regulations have become a more common, though subtler, form of protection.
This a particularly relevant matter for Argentina, where the poverty headcount currently is 26.9% 1 , and where the scope for inward-looking development strategies is rather limited. The performance of Argentina's exports shows that the requirements for Argentine …rms to enter export markets in industrialized countries largely exceeds competitive costs. Indeed, a business survey conducted by IERAL in 2004 has shown that the compliance with standards and technical regulations in the North requires setup costs that may prevent the entry of a large number of potentially exporting …rms, specially SMEs and that may raise variable costs of production for those who export, with a negative impact on their export share. These costs come from setting up a quality control and management system, from the adoption of new testing procedures, from product and process re-designs, from investment in additional plant and equipment and from costly search of information. 2 This means that standards in rich countries, regardless of their reasonability, may be imposing barriers to entry into industrialized countries' markets that in turn generate a segmentation of production between exporting and non-exporting …rms in developing countries. It has been documented that exporting …rms have higher productivity and thus, pay higher wages. These …rms also tend to display higher quality standards. In general, only the 3 most productive …rms in a developing country like Argentina enter the export market (to industrialized countries), producing better quality goods for export than for the domestic markets in order to supply richer developed country consumers. For example, segmentation can occur even within a same …rm, where there are di¤erent quality in products as documented in Verhoogen (2004) for the Volkswagen plant in Mexico. 3 This segmentation in production has signi…cant e¤ects on the labor markets, where workers employed in exporting …rms get higher wages and workers employed in non-exporting …rms get lower wages. In this setup, more stringent standards are likely to exacerbate the segmentation in production and, through its e¤ects on the labor market, lead to bigger inter-…rm wage inequality and to possible employment problems if the size of the exporting sector is reduced. Additionally, compliance with standards is likely to be skill-intensive, thus leading to a bigger skill premium.
The aim of this paper is to appraise to what extent the standards and technical regulations imposed by the US and the EU may result in a bigger segmentation of production and lower export shares, with a negative direct e¤ect on employment and an increase of intra and inter …rm wage inequality.
In the next section we provide a more thorough description and discussion of the evolution and rationale for standards and technical regulations in the world and why it is a relevant matter for Argentina. This section generates the hypotheses to test the e¤ects of standards on exports, employment and wages. Sections ?? and ?? describe the proposed methodology for testing these hypotheses and the methodology we will use. Section ??
describes the data bases that we intend to use. Section ?? presents the results. Finally ??
shows our conclusions. 4 
OECD policies: Standards and technical regulations 2.1 Standards and technical regulations in industrialized countries
Standards and technical regulations, be it for products, labor, or for the environment, are applied to mitigate against health and environmental risks, to prevent deceptive practices, and to reduce transaction costs in business by providing common reference points for notions of "quality", "safety", "authenticity", "good practice", and "sustainability"(World Bank 4 ).
Standards are speci…cations that relates to product attributes. They can take di¤erent forms. Henson (2004) Testing and quality control standards (e.g. methods to determine protein content of animal feed) Distinction can also be made between standards that relate to process and production methods (PPM) and to products. Product standards focus on characteristics of the …nal product (size, composition, function, safety, etc) whereas PPM address the way in which a product is made. 5 Standards can also di¤er in freedom of choice regarding compliance. They can be mandatory (legally) or they can be voluntary. Mandatory standards are known as technical regulations and they are set by public institutions (regulatory agencies). Compliance of mandatory standards is obligatory. They are usually related to safety and health, when there is asymmetric information and the buyer can either not assess reliably the safety of the product or it can only do it at a very high cost. Voluntary standards arise from a 5 coordinated process, mainly of private organizations or they arise form an uncoordinated process of market -based competition (de facto mandatory standards).
Usually, in the early stages of economic development, standards are mandatory and set by public institutions. As an economy develops, voluntary public standards and private standards become widespread. In developed economies, most private standards become de facto mandatory established by market competition.
Depending upon the particular industry or market circumstances, standards and technical regulations can either raise or lower economic e¢ ciency; promote or block competition; facilitate or constrain international trade; and enable or exclude the participation of the poor in remunerative economic activities.
Mandatory standards are regulated by WTO to guarantee they only impede trade to achieve a legitimate objective and that they if they do it, it is in the least trade-distortive manner. The 1947 GATT accord allowed the use of minimum standards to protect human, animal and plant health, as well as bring order to the market. The World Trade Organization (WTO) established that standards can di¤er from internationally accepted levels only when there is scienti…c evidence supporting the decision. At multilateral level, there are two binding WTO agreements which intend to limit abusive uses of standards for protection purposes. These are: the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS Agreement) and the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (the TBT Agreement). 6 6 World Trade Organization Agreements: The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement (SPS) entered into force on 1 January 1995 and allows members to take scienti…cally based measures to protect public health. The agreement covers standards which are related to animals, plant material, and human health. The agreement commits members to base these measures on internationally established guidelines and risk assessment procedures. In the case of particularly stringent measures, countries must present scienti…c justi…cation. When existing scienti…c evidence is insu¢ cient to determine risk, members may adopt measures on the basis of available information, but must obtain additional information to objectively ground their assessment of risk within a reasonable period of time. Generally speaking, the SPS Agreement is a compromise that permits countries to take measures to protect public health within their borders so long as they do so in a manner that restricts trade as little as possible. The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (TBT) strikes a delicate balance between the policy goals of trade facilitation and national autonomy in technical regulations. The agreement attempts to extricate the trade-facilitating aspects of standards from their trade-distorting potential by obligating countries to ensure that technical regulations and product standards do not unnecessarily restrict international trade. The agreement covers mandatory provisions of government technical regulations that specify products characteristics or their related processes and production methods. The TBT Agreement works toward this end in three ways. The agreement encourages "standard equivalence" between countries, in other words, the formal acceptance of the standards of other countries through explicit agreements. It also promotes the use of international standards. It mandates that countries establish enquiry points and national noti…cation authorities (the two may be the same body) in order to answer questions 6 Although the accords expressly stated that standards should not be used as covert forms of protectionism, sometimes protection is the only goal of the standard. They usually apply to both national and foreign production, and thus do not correspond to the classical form of protectionism which openly discriminate against imports. However, in practice, standards and technical regulations may be used strategically to enhance the competitive position of countries or individual …rms. Standards and technical regulations can potentially impede international trade, for example, by imposing unnecessary costly and time consuming tests or by laying out unjusti…ed di¤erent requirements in di¤erent markets. As traditional trade barriers to trade have fallen, these non-tari¤ barriers have become of particular concern to …rms in developing countries, which may bear relatively larger costs in meeting their requirements than their counterparts in developed nations.
A greater number and wider range of standards are being implemented globally. Noti…cations of TBT and SPS measures has increased markedly since between 2005 and 1995.
SPS noti…cations grew 658% and TBT noti…cations, 315%. Certi…cations of processes of quality assurance, ISO 9000 series of standards on quality management systems and ISO 14000 series on environmental management systems, are becoming widespread in both industrialized and developing countries and has become a de-facto requirement. Besides, as standards apply to either product characteristics, quality control systems and processes by which they are manufactured, provided and distributed, many standards might apply to a single product.
Measuring the e¤ect of standards on trade is a di¢ cult task because of the complex nature of standards. Exporters might gain competitive advantage from complying with the standards and might, in the end, gain market share. Still, compliance costs are far from unimportant. Moreover, a wide range of standards might apply to the same product.
Compliance costs usually have a …xed component, associated with redesigning needs and measured as the investment required for compliance, and a variable cost that results from about SPS regulations and notify other nations of new regulations respectively. Enquiry points compile all available information in that country on product standards and trade regulations and provide it to other members upon request. The national noti…cation authorities report changes in trade policy to the WTO and receive and take comments on these measures. To sum up, the SPS and TBT Agreements limit the scope for importing countries to impose arbitrary and unjusti…ed requirements on exports from LDCs and encourage the use of internationally developed standards as the safety/quality reference for products moving in world trade irrespective of the supplier. It also establishes dispute settlement mechanisms and panels. 7 altering capital and labor usages to meet the recurring costs of complying. They might vary widely, from country to country and from industry to industry and between di¤erent types of standards. This will depend on the prevailing structure and conditions of the supply chain, the extent of private-public and private-private cooperation, domestic capacity, level of development of the export industry and so on. Equally important, compliance costs include not only the cost of meeting the technical requirement, but also the cost of verifying that the requirement is met, known as the conformity assessment. Often, the conformity assessment represents the largest barrier to trade. All these will determine if only incremental changes are needed or if major adjustment to meet the standards are required. In accomplishing standards exporters face administrative, technical and …nancial burden that might act as an entry barrier for individual suppliers, mainly small scale. This complex nature of in ‡uence of standards on trade impedes generalization, and evidence remains based on case studies and speci…c measurements. The World Bank conducted a survey over 689 …rms and 17 developing countries inquiring on di¤erent regulatory requirements to globally investigate the impacts of technical requirements 7 . The survey helps appraise the incremental cost of standard compliance as a proportion of sales by industry, as shown in Table 2 in the appendix.
Unlike tari¤s, trade barriers due to standards and regulations have di¤erentiated e¤ect on the decision to enter a market, depending on …rm's characteristics. A key di¤erence between both kind of protections may be that tari¤s a¤ect how much to import whereas …xed costs of compliance due to standards may a¤ect the decision whether to export or not. Maskus et al. (2004) …nd that bigger set-up costs associated to more severe standards also raise variable costs of production, thus acting as import taxes as well. Chen et al (2004) …nd that technical regulations in developed countries adversely a¤ect …rms propensity to export in developing countries. Besides, they also …nd empirical evidence that standards and testing procedures impede exporter'market entry, reducing the likelihood of exporting to multiple countries.
Hence, harmful e¤ects of standards seem to have particular incidence on developing countries whereas bene…ts are mainly accrued by developed economies. This impact between developed and developing economies might be explained by the …xed costs imposed by meeting standards. These costs associated with foreign standards and technical requirements may be born publicly or privately. Usually, developing countries do not have adequate public testing capacity due to lack of public resources and they also face di¢ culties in collective action. As a result, costs of compliance are mainly borne by individual …rms and, consequently, impede access to …rms from developing countries, particularly smaller …rms. 8 Additionally, there are a proliferation of Mutual Recognition Agreements on standards and regulations aiming at harmonization or mutual recognition of national standards that also aim at facilitating trade between nations and countries, but mainly developed ones, which further excludes developing economies. 9 Accordingly, accomplishing with international standards require additional e¤orts which might be impossible to a¤ord in developing economies. As an example, Finger and Shuler show that the World Bank spent between 1991 and 1996 US$ 82.7 millions in Argentina in a project to assist in the implementation of sanitary and phytosanitary regulations.
Consequently, imposing standards may generate development problems. Even though under the WTO agreements (SPS, TBT, TRIPS) these regulations should be implemented in manners that restrict trade as little as possible and preserve health and safety, they might disguise protective measures as protection from speci…c risks.
From trade liberalization to standards and technical regulations
It is mostly agreed that trade related standards and technical regulations have risen in importance over tari¤s as means of trade protection. The application of product regulation and standards is becoming increasingly contentious as an implicit non-tari¤ barrier to trade (Maskus, Wilson and Otsuki, 2001) . Even though WTO agreements (TBT and SPS) have increased transparency in regulatory systems and promoted conformity to international 8 One example is given by the investment in equipment used to test for electromagnetic interference in electrical machinery which amounts US$ 1 million and is rendered obsolete every time the technical regulations in this area are changed, which happens very often. 9 A noteworthy example is provided by some wineries in Argentina, which sell wine to most developed countries (including the US, England and Japan), but not to Germany because of a stringent regulation on the precise blend of grapes for producing wine. This standard does not operate however for US wineries exporting to Germany because of a Mutual Recognition of Standards Agreement. standards, they remain a main concern specially for developing countries. Moreover, in developing countries, development issues on certi…cation capacity building arise and international aid is required to build local capacity to meet standards. However, there still are many unknowns to determine the economic impact of regulations and conformity assessment requirements. As a result, it is di¢ cult to establish negotiation priorities and policy trade-o¤s. In this section we draw on the main conclusions of the discussion in Maskus and Wilson (2001) , where they present an overview of the policy debate around technical barriers to trade and product standards. As it has been mentioned above, non-tari¤ barriers have signi…cant e¤ects on developing countries, which may incur in additional costs in order to meet them.
The economic impact of di¤ering regulations and conformity assessment requirements directly a¤ect trade policy choices and success or failure of liberalization e¤orts. Thus empirical work on standards is crucial.
One of the more important conclusions of their work is the need to develop empirical analysis of the e¤ects of standards on trade. For that, they recommend the following steps, 1. availability of …rm level surveys in developing countries 2. devising methods for assessing how standards can restrict trade in developing countries 3. which econometrics approaches can be used to micro data to see the e¤ect of standards on exports.
According to Wilson (1999) , developing countries members of the WTO have made standards and TBT a priority in the trade agenda post-Seattle. Among the key points raised by these members are both technical assistance in order to implement WTO obligations on standards and concerns over the use of environmental regulations by developed countries as motives to block imports.
While there is not a speci…c year to which we can say that standard requirement significantly started to a¤ect export decisions to the EU and US, according to Maskus, Wilson and Otsuki (2001) And both point at 1995.
Evolution of exports and standards in Argentina
After the 2001 crisis, most of private investment in Argentina has been directed towards expanding production for the domestic market rather than improving quality. The amount of investment directed towards improving product quality was reduced from 43.6% in 2001 to 20.8% in 2006 as it can be observed in Table ? ?.
While total investment has recovered from pre-crisis levels, its composition has changed.
There is a much higher participation of residential and public investment on total investment, concentrated in non exporting sectors. 10 This lower investment in quality is consistent with the fact that although exports of manufacturing products are showing a more dynamic behavior than before the crisis, the countries of destination of such exports generally demand lower quality than the EU and US.
Graph I shows the relation existing between industrial exports and ISO 9000 certi…ca-tion. While the ISO 9000 certi…cations are certi…cations of quality management systems and not of product quality, they can be considered a good proxy for the latter, since generally both go hand in hand.
Any increase in standard stringency, as it has been happening in developed countries in recent years, may have the short run e¤ect of discouraging the already sluggish behavior of Argentine exports to the EU and US. In Table ? ? we can observe the cost faced by Latin American companies of di¤erent industries in order to ful…l with quality requirements and technical regulations demanded by OECD countries. Finally, we can appraise the incremental cost of complying with speci…c standards in order to export to US and EU for Argentine …rms as obtained from Sanchez and Butler (2005) in Table ? ?.
Such costs include ISO type environmental and product certi…cations, and the cost of investing in quality development. As it can be observed, such costs are far from negligible and they are proportionally higher the smaller the size and scale of the …rm.
Finally, we would like to show some statistical di¤erences between human capital indicators of exporting vs. non exporting …rms. As shown Table ? ?, average wages in exporting industries are 18% higher than in the non-exporting sector. Also, labor informality rates (which bear a high correlation with poverty through lower wages) are higher in the non exporting sector. Lastly, standard estimation of Mincer (see Table ? ?) equations show that returns to schooling and experience are much higher in the exporting than in the non exporting sector.
Testable hypotheses
From the previous sections we can suggest several hypotheses which could be tested. More stringent standards will have e¤ects on exports, employment, skill intensity and wages at the …rm level. For example, we could conjecture the following e¤ects of an increase in standard stringency:
1. The participation of exports to industrialized countries on total exports and output will decline.
2. Bigger …xed costs of compliance will increase the probability of switching from exporting to industrialized countries to exporting to other countries, or to non-exporting.
3. Employment of unskilled labor in …rms exporting to industrialized countries will decline, as a result of their bigger skill intensities and reduced output.
4. The e¤ect on skilled labor will be ambiguous for these …rms, since products complying with standards require higher skill intensity but such exports may fall.
5. Total employment of exporting …rms will decline.
6. The skill intensity of employment will go up for exporting …rms, as standard compliance is skill intensive. 7. Average wages will increase for these …rms, raising inter…rm wage inequality.
Unfortunately, data limitations -which will be explained in the next section-allow us just to test three hypotheses of the ones mentioned above: 11 1. The participation of exports on total output will decline.
2. The skill intensity of employment will go up for exporting …rms.
3. Average wages will increase for these …rms as a result of the bigger skill intensity of standard compliance.
Testing methodology
In order to test the …rst hypothesis we could use panel data from the National Survey on Firms'Innovation and Technological Behavior 12 at the …rm level for 1992, 1996, 1998 and 2001 . We have information on expenditure in general certi…cations such as ISO 9001, sector speci…c certi…cations and environmental certi…cations and many other …rm characteristics as well. While the variables accounting for product certi…cation can be considered as proxies for standard compliance, we come across a problem of endogeneity, since almost surely companies already exporting spent more on standards in the past. Moreover, the number of observations for product certi…cation is small.
In order to overcome these problems, we suggest a di¤erent approach for estimation: as mentioned in the previous section, around 1995 standards became signi…cantly more stringent and thus we may assume that there is some sort of structural change in standards requirement at some point around that time. If we work with data corresponding to 1992 and 1 1 Data availability imposed serious limitations for testing our priors. In particular, the number of observations for …rms exporting to industrialized countries did not have good information about cost of standard compliance at the …rm level. Neither the role of entry/exit could not be assessed with the data available, since there were too few observations to perform this analysis. Information about the level of skills for each …rm workers was also limited, being the skill ratio the only information available. Finally, as far as wages are concerned there was only information on average wages. 1 2 The contents of this survey are explained in the next section 13 2001, we can resort to methodologies that are generally used for program evaluation, using a Di¤erence in Di¤erence estimator. 13 In this sense, our priors indicate that an increase in standards imposed by EU and US will have no direct e¤ect on Argentine companies who devote their production to the internal market or who sell their exports to other destinations like Mercosur. However, it will have some e¤ect on the ones exporting to the US and the EU. In this sense we can de…ne a treatment (companies exporting to the EU and US) and a control group (companies exporting to Mercosur) and see the e¤ect of the treatment (structural change in standard requirements) on export shares. In order to do that, we estimate a DID estimator which is equivalent to a two dimensional …xed e¤ects panel estimation that can be speci…ed as follows:
where Y it are export shares of …rm i at period t, I it is a binary variable which takes the value one for companies su¤ering the stringency in standards at year t and zero otherwise, X it is a vector of …rm and time speci…c variables, t is a common e¤ect for all …rms which varies over time, i is a …rm speci…c time invariant …xed e¤ect. Finally, " it is an error, independent of …xed and trend e¤ects. (Chamberlain 1984) .
In this estimation, measures the e¤ect of changing standards on export shares. Our hypothesis is that this coe¢ cient is negative. 14 In order to test the second and the third hypotheses, where we measure the e¤ect of changing standards on employment and wages we must overcome the problem of estimating jointly wage equations and labor demands, which requires a GE model, which goes beyond the scope of this research project. 1 3 For robustness, we tried to split the sample in di¤erent periods, 1992-1996 and 1998-2001 and found no e¤ects of standards, which supports our priors that the structural change took place around 1995. Results of these estimations are available upon request. 1 4 While it can be argued that Iit may be endogenous, re ‡ecting the fact that it represents …rm's decision to stay in the export markets, we did not …nd many observations in our sample which dropped the EU and US as main destination all over the period analyzed. This somehow supports the idea that standard stringency may be causing marginal e¤ects on export shares, but not entry/exit decisions. If this were the case and there were some valid instrument for Iit, our experiment would be calculating a lower bound for the e¤ect of standard stringecy on export shares. 14 We again use a similar DID approach as we did in the …rst hypothesis. For the labor demand equations, we will use the adequate IV procedure, as we will explain below, in order to overcome the endogeneity problem (we use as an IV for wages the average sector wage).
Finally, labor demand is a function of …rm characteristics and of instrumented wages, where we want to see the e¤ect of changing standards.
Datasets

The World Bank Technical Barriers to Trade Survey
The World Bank Technical Barriers to Trade Survey was the …rst attempt to investigate the impacts of technical requirements on trade on a set of developing countries across regions, including Argentina. The intent of the survey was to solicit information from agricultural, manufacturing, and trade …rms in developing countries regarding technical barriers encountered in major export markets that impact trade facilitation, and the costs associated with meeting standards and regulatory requirements. Information on technical regulations speci…c to …ve major exports markets also enables comparisons of the stringency and importance of standard and technical regulations by exports markets such as the European Union, United States, Japan, Canada, and Australia. The data are also relevant to investigate of the role of the Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) to promote trade. The Survey includes information on countries such as Argentina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland, Chile, Honduras, Panama, Iran, Jordan, India, Pakistan, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, and Uganda. The …ndings of the Survey can be used in our current framework, to extend our between and within sector analysis to a between and within country analysis.
National Survey on Firms'Innovation and Technological Behavior
The National Survey on Firms'Innovation and Technological Behavior (NSFITB) is a survey developed by the National Institute of Statistics and Census (INDEC) for the 1992-1996 and 1998-2001 periods. It surveys a sample of more than 1600 industries representing over 50% of the Argentine universe of …rms. While the main objective of this database is the gathering of information about innovation and technological behavior of Argentine …rms, it has also abundant information regarding …rm characteristics (ownership, export shares and destination, employment structure, factor intensity, etc.). Regarding standards the surveyed …rms de…ne the name, year and cost of the di¤erent certi…cations attained. Moreover, the survey has di¤erent measures of …rm'productivity and each …rm is compared to each most advanced competitor in the …eld in terms of a series of indicators. It also asks speci…c questions as to whether innovation is devoted to improve the quality of products in order to be able to sell in foreign markets. well as the retrospective data on labor market activity during the previous month. In terms of personal, demographic, and economic information on individual household members, it provides the following information: labor market status (employed, unemployed or non labor force), relation to household head, age, sex, marital status, hours worked in the survey week, occupation, …rm size and sector of activity, non labor income, schooling, number of children, hourly wage, number of hours worked. It is not di¢ cult to join personal and household …les and to create from these joined database variables related to the household than can in ‡uence individual behavior towards the labor market. The original PHS had a rotating sample design, with households (addresses, strictly speaking) in the survey for four waves (two years) renewing the sample for each wave. The continuous survey has a rotating sample design called 2-2-2. Households on a determined area are included in the 16 sample during two consecutive quarters. Then these households are excluded for other two quarters. Finally, those same households are included on the sample for 2 more consecutive quarters. In this way, we can gather information from a household for about an year and a half.
The Permanent Household Survey
Results
As mentioned above, we estimated three DID equations, one for export shares, one for labor demand and one for wages. Several controls and dependent variable speci…cations were used.
As we will discuss below, Argentina su¤ered di¤erent shocks which could be a¤ecting its export performance other than the change in standards: the Mexican devaluation (1994), the Brazilian devaluation (1999) and Mexico joining the NAFTA (1993).
Impact of standards on export shares
The results for each equation can be seen in the appendix. As it was suspected, the increase in standards stringency has a negative e¤ects on the export shares. More stringent standards appear to reduce …rms'export shares (to the US and EU) by 33 basic points.
Results are robust to di¤erent speci…cations of the equations we estimated. We used di¤erent controls: industry export shares (Industry export share), investment in capital goods over total sales (KIsales), skilled labor over total labor (NTechNtotal), sales per employee, index of wages per employee, export of the industry to the EU and US (XEUUS), real exchange rate (TCR) and industry share of employment (SecN1).
Impact of standards on labor demand and its composition
For our labor demand equation, we have three di¤erent speci…cations for the dependent variables: number of employees and two speci…cation for the ratio of white collar employees to total workers ((NTechNtotal) and (NProfNtotal). The change in standard stringency has no e¤ects on the total number of employees, but a positive e¤ect on white collar/blue collar employment ratio in the exporting …rms. In particular, for the …rms exporting to the US and EU, more stringent standards appear to have increased their share of technical personnel.
Impact on wages
In order to measure the e¤ect of standard stringency on wages, we use as dependent variable wages per employee. While the ideal dependent variable would be wages for each kind of workers (white and blue collar), we do not have such information. The overall e¤ect of standard stringency on average wages is negative, contradicting our predictions. We believe that such e¤ect can be consistent with bargaining theories where a lower net producer price is passed on to workers in the form of lower wages.
Competing explanations
It is very hard to argue that the change in standard stringency analyzed above is the only economic shock that might be a¤ecting export performance su¤ered by Argentina in the period considered. Argentina su¤ered many shocks which could have a¤ected exports.
More speci…cally, Argentina was hit by the Mexican and Brazilian crisis and the entrance of Mexico to the NAFTA.
To account for the di¤erent shocks, we used diverse controls in our regressions. We used the real exchange rate faced by each sector. An increase in the real exchange rate, TCR, (accounting for nominal devaluation, lowering or increasing tari¤s, etc.) might be a¤ecting export shares other than the change in standards. Industry export share was also considered, since for Argentina, sectors which are export oriented are in general more productive and better prepared to face negative shocks. Capital and skill intensity (KIsales and NTechTotal) are used to account for the fact that the same increase in standard stringency, will a¤ect less to industries that are more capital and or skill intensive. Finally, sales per employee and wages per employee are used as proxies for …rm's productivity.
If any of the above mentioned shocks were driving our change in export shares to industrialized countries, we would have di¤erent results. For example, a devaluation in Brazil will result in a loss of competitiveness of Argentine products which will reduce export shares, skill ratio and average wages in exporting industries. The same would happen for Mexico's devaluation and for the Mexico entering the NAFTA.
Conclusions
Our results go in line with our priors. An increase in standard stringency reduces export shares of the already exporting …rms. Conditional on reducing export shares, the …rms which export increase their relative demand for more skilled workers. Moreover, average wages per employee are reduced. However, the fact that demand for skilled labor increases while average wages are reduced deserves further examination, since such results are counterintuitive. Such result might be explained by bargaining theories, where a lower net producer price due to the increase in costs is passed on to workers in the form of lower wages.
Our results represent a contribution to existing empirical research about the e¤ects of standards on trade. One of the severe limitations to test our hypotheses is the data availability. Our work suggest the need of more e¤ort in gathering …rm level micro data in order to measure the e¤ect of standards on trade, employment and wages to be able to formulate policy recommendations.
We could not derive poverty and income distribution implications with our data, but there is evidence which links positively trade and poverty reduction, so any policy which discourages exports will a¤ect poverty at some point. As far as income distribution is concerned, evidence is mixed.
For the speci…c case of Argentina, where the gap between wages, returns to schooling and informality between workers in the exporting and non exporting sector is widening, facilitating the compliance with standards of Argentine …rms should be a top priority in the agenda.
Finally, technical assistance from OECD countries to developing countries with the objective of helping the later to comply with the standards is also a valuable policy recommendation. t statistics in parentheses, dependent variable is export shares * signi…cant at 5%; ** signi…cant at 1% t statistics in parentheses * signi…cant at 5%; ** signi…cant at 1% t statistics in parentheses * signi…cant at 5%; ** signi…cant at 1%
